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COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - RACIAL RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS-
ACTION FOR DAMAGES HELD OUTSIDE DOCTRINE OF SHELLEY V.
KRAEMER.-Plaintiffs were white persons who owned lots in
Santa Fe Place in Kansas City, Missouri. Defendants, also white
persons, owned lots in the same subdivision. The land of both
the plaintiffs and the defendants was subject to a private restric-
tive agreement which provided that none of the lots could be
devised, sold, leased, or occupied by Negroes. Both the plaintiffs
and the defendants were parties to the agreement either as
original makers or as successors in interest. The defendants in
violation of the private agreement sold a lot to one Street, a
Negro, and the plaintiffs filed a petition to restrain Street from
buying and occupying and to restrain the defendants from
selling to Street. The original petition was dismissed on the
basis of Shelley v. Kra-emer;' however, the Supreme Court of
Missouri found that the plaintiffs' amended petition stated a
cause of action for damages for the breach of the private agree-
ment. The court, in remanding the case for trial, held that the
United States Supreme Court's ruling in Shelley v. Kraemer did
not prohibit the award of damages for a breach of racial cove-
nant, but only prohibited specific enforcement of the covenant.2
Much has been written as to the extent and the meaning of the
so-called "racial covenant cases"' but, until the decision by the
Supreme Court of Missouri in the principal case, there has been
a dearth of judicial interpretation and application of the prin-
ciples there expounded. Several writers- have taken the position
that the decisions in the racial covenant cases barred any recov-
ery of damages for the breach of a racial covenant and that these
cases extended the rights protected against state action in the
1. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
2. Weiss v. Leaon, 225 S.W.2nd 127 (Mo. 1949).
3. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24(1948).
4. Gershan, Restrictive Covenants and Equal Protection-The New Rule
in Shelley's Case, 21 So. CALiF. L. REV. 358 (1948); Ming, Racial Restric-
tions and The Fourteenth Amendment: The Restrictive Covenant Cases, 16
U. OF CHI. L. REv. 203 (1949) ; Scanlan, Racial Restrictions in Real Estate
-Property Values Versus Human Values, 24 NOTRE DAmE LAW 157 (1949);
Comment, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1450 (1948); Comment, 3 ARK. L. REV. 96
(1948).
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Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. The Mis-
souri court, in authorizing an award of damages, dismissed such
contentions as mere speculation, and held that their decision was
not inconsistent with Shelley v. Kraemer, or Hurd v. Hodge.5
It is submitted that the court's holding that Shelley v. Kraemer
is not controlling on the issue of an award of damages is well
taken.
In the Shelley case the validity of restrictive racial covenants
was not denied. Twenty-two years previously, in Corrigan v.
Buckley,8 such covenants entered into by private individuals in
respect to the control and disposition of their own property were
held not to be voided by either the Fourteenth Amendment or the
Civil Rights Act.7 Thus the question before the Supreme Court
in the Shelley case was not as to the validity of such covenants,
but rather whether the enforcement of the admittedly valid cove-
nants by a state court constituted state atiorn of such a nature
as to be violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. Chief Justice
Vinson, in expressing the opinion of the Court, held that "judi-
cial enforcement" of such covenants by a state court was state
action within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment and
further that such enforcement was discriminatory within the
meaning of the equal protection clause and therefore prohibited
by the amendment. The crucial phrase, of course, is "judicial
enforcement," for upon its meaning rests the correctness or in-
correctness of the Missouri Court's interpretation of that deci-
sion. If the phrase was meant to mean any and all relief that
a court may award, then the giving of damages is necessarily
forbidden. However, if the phrase was meant to be construed
more narrowly and to pertain only to equitable remedies akin
to specific performance and injunctive relief, then Shelley v.
Kraemer clearly does not bar an award of damages for a breach
of a racial covenant. For several reasons the latter interpreta-
tion, adopted by the Missouri court in the instant case, would
seem more correct.
5. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
6. Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1927). It has been suggested that
this case was overruled by Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948), see Note,
3 A.L.R.2d. (1948), but technically speaking it was not. The Cori an case
held that such covenants were not against the federal public policy. The
Hurd case held that to enforce such covenants when state courts were
denied the right to enforce them would be inconsistent and against public
policy, but it did not invalidate such covenants.
7. 14 STAT. 27 (1866), 8 U.S.C. §42 (1946).
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It is, of course, axiomatic that a court should only pass upon
the precise issues at bar; any further declarations by a court,
being nothing more than dicta, are not entitled to any compelling
adherence under the doctrine of stare decisis. This in itself is
sufficient reason to sustain the Missouri court's position that the
Shelley case is not controlling, as the issue of an award of dam-
ages was not before the court in that case.
However, even disregarding this reason, there are other rea-
sons which lend support to the Missouri court's interpretation
of the ambiguous phrase "judicial enforcement." The opinions
in both the Shelley case and the Hurcd case seem to have been
written with the conscious effort to decide only the exact question
at hand and to leave all other questions which might arise con-
cerning racial covenants for a later determination. There would
seem to be no reason why, if the court meant to bar an award
of damages, a declaration to that effect was not specifically
included in the lengthy and well-considered opinions of the com-
pansion cases. Another indication that the phrase was not meant
to include an award of damages is found in the concurring opin-
ion of Justice Frankfurter in Hurd v. Hodge., The learned
Justice felt that, since the appeal for relief against the breach
of the covenant was to the equity side of the court, the entire
case could be dismissed on the basis of the "exercise of a sound
judicial discretion." This is a strong indication that the Court
only concerned itself with the equitable issues that were actually
before it and did not pass upon the merits of the legal
question of damages. Finally, it is presumed that the Court was
well aware of the dissenting opinion of Judge Edgerton of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in
Hurd v. Hodge.9 In developing the view which was later followed
by the Supreme Court in the racial covenant cases when certio-
rari was granted, Judge Edgerton also used the rather unfortu-
nate word "enforcement" and the Chief Justice may well have
been acquainted with and influenced by Judge Edgerton's termi-
nology. It is interesting to note the following explanation given
by Judge Edgerton in relation to the question of whether "en-
forcement" included an award of damages:
8. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 36 (1948).9. See Hurd v. Hodge, 162 F.2d 233, 235 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
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To say that the Constitution forbids direct and actual en-
forcement of a racial covenant by injunction- the only
remedy which is intended to and necessarily does prevent
Negroes from acquiring and using restricted property-is
not to say that it forbids to a neighboring property owner
such damages, if any, as an executed sale to a Negro may
be shown to have caused.10
While the reasons here presented are obviously not conclusive
that the Supreme Court in Shelley v. Kraemer meant a narrow
construction of the phrase "judicial enforcement," they do afford
a strong basis for the Missouri court's position that Shelley v.
Kraemer is not controlling authority on the issue of an award
of damages for a breach of a racial covenant.
However, granted that the Shelley case is not controlling on
the issues presented by the principal case, the ultimate question
still remains to be answered. Is an award of damages for the
breach of a racial covenant state action and discriminatory under
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? The
Missouri court answered this question in the negative.
There would seem to be little or no basis upon which to deny
that an award of damages by a state court is state action. Judi-
cial action might very well have been found to be state action
at any time after the decision in Ex larte Virginia," and if any
doubt remained it was removed by the court in Sheley V.
Kraemer when it was said:
That the action of state courts and of judicial officers in
their official capacities is to be regarded as action of the
state within the meaning of the 14th Amendment, is a propo-
sition which has long been established by the decisions of
this court. 12
Thus the basic question is not whether the action is state action
but whether the state action is discriminatory. The answer to
this question is not found without difficulty.
It is immediately ascertainable that if any discrimination
exists in awarding damages for the breach of a racial covenant
the discrimination is indirect.23 In a case involving an award
of damages the individual Negro is in no way hurt, as under
the doctrine of Shelley v. Kraemer, the Negro is and must be
10. Id. at 240 (Judge's Note 22).
11. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 331 (1880).
12. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1948).
13. Inducing breach.
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given the title and occupancy of the land he purchased. Tle only
individual directly injured by an award of damages is the
breaching party; and this injury is of course not of a discrimina-
tory nature; neither is it in reality an injury but actually a
remedial award for a breach of contract to which he is the
breaching party. This is the theory of the principal case. But,
while it is clear that there is no direct discrimination by an
award of damages, it is equally clear that there is an indirect
discrimination against the entire Negro race. A party to a racial
covenant will be much more reluctant to break that covenant
and sell to a Negro if he knows that he will be subjected to
damage suits by other parties to the restrictive agreement.
Further, the number of suits for damages against the breaching
party can at least theoretically number as many as there are
parties to the agreement, which in the case of a large subdivision
may prove to be quite numerous. Thus the award of damages
by a state court for the breach of a restrictive agreement does
indirectly discriminate against the Negro race as it will have
a tendency to bring about a drastic 'reduction in the number of
willing sellers of land to Negroes. The ultimate question there-
fore is whether indirect discrimination by the state is prohibited
by the Fourteenth Amendment. A search of the authorities has
revealed no answer to this question, and it would seem that it
has been seldom litigated.
If on appeal the instant case is reversed and indirect discrimi-
nation held to be violative of the Fourteenth Amendment, a per-
plexing question of private law will present itself. It is now well
established that the racial covenants themselves, standing alone,
are valid and not voided by the Fourteenth Amendment or by
the Civil Rights Act.1' Thus, since the covenants are not voided
by the Constitution or any statute enacted in pursuance thereof,
their validity becomes one of the public policy of each state, and
under the doctrine of Erie R. R. Co. v. Tompkins" this declara-
tion of public policy is not reviewable by the Supreme Court of
the United States. Since the great majority of the states have
held the covenants, 6 it would seem that their validity is unim-
peachable. But can there be a valid contract if there is no remedy?
14. Id. at 13; Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 330 (1927).
15. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
16. Note, 3 A.L.R.2d 486 (1948).
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If they cannot be enforced, as was held in the Shelley case, and if
it is held that damages for their breach will not lie, then are
such covenants actually valid? The problem presents, at the very
least, some real theoretical difficulties. A possible solution would
seem to be to fit the covenants into the class which the Restate-
ment of Contracts calls "Unenforceable Contracts." 17 Another
possible solution was advanced in the racial covenant cases them-
selves but ignored in the' decisions. It was suggested that in
view of the ratification of the United Nations Charter by this
country the covenants could be declared void on the basis of the
treaty power.:8 While it would seem that the section referred to
in that Charter was more a declaration of purposes than
a commitment, it is possible that other treaties with individual
nations might well support this contention. In the final analysis,
however, as to this subsidiary problem, it is doubtful whether
the court would be much concerned with the symmetry of the
law if it decided that a civil liberty was being invaded by an
award of damages.
In summary, it is submitted that the Missouri court's position
that the Shelley case is not controlling on the issues of damages
is well taken. It also would seem that the basic question on
review is not whether there has been state action but whether
the indirect result of that action is discriminatory within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. While a reversal of the
principal case is highly desirable and would be in keeping with
the intents and purposes of the original framers of the Amend-
ment, such a result would be of such magnitude in extending the
coverage of that Amendment that it cannot be said with any
conclusiveness that on appeal the instant case will be reversed.
A. RODNEY WEISS
17. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §14 (1932). While this is a pos-
sible solution it is a solution which is open to debate. An unenforceable
contract is defined ^as one which the law recognizes in some indirect or
collateral way as creating a duty of performance, though there has been
no ratification. Thus a contract the enforcement of which is barred by the
Statute of Limitations may still have indirect legal consequences since a
creditor, if he has security under the contract, may apply that security
toward the debt. Likewise where a bargain is unenforceable because of the
Statute of Frauds third persons may not defeat the claims of either con-
tracting party as such a defense is only obtainable interparty. In the case
of a racial covenant, however, what legal consequences would follow to
make it analogous to these examples of unenforceable contracts? It would
seem none.
18. Note, 3 A.L.R.2d 484 (1948).
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